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Do National Cultures Matter in the Containment of COVID-19? 
 
Introduction 
In December 2019, an unusual pneumonia-like illness erupted in Wuhan, the capital city of 
Hubei province in central China.  A novel strain of coronavirus, or SARS-CoV-2, a member of 
the coronavirus family, turned out to be the culprit infecting Chinese people across the country 
and then rapidly sweeping the world.  The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 
outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” on January 30, 2020 and a 
“pandemic” on March 11.  As of August 22, 2020, there were 22,812,491 confirmed cases of the 
coronavirus disease, COVID-19, including 795,132 deaths, resulting in devastating social, 
economic, and political consequences (WHO, 2020). 
To mitigate or even stop the viral transmission, and indeed, a global public health crisis 
that stands unprecedented in living memory, governments worldwide have imposed various 
interventions, some as severe as locking down an entire city or a larger part of a country, closing 
borders, and restricting travel within borders; others as moderate as tracing and quarantining 
those exposed to the virus, maintaining social-distancing, enacting shelter-in-place or stay-at-
home, and paying attention to personal hygiene.  Implementation of such measures requires not 
only governments’ strong resolve but also the public’s voluntary and simultaneous compliance 
and self-disciplining out of everyone’s interests. 
Months into the world’s fight against the coronavirus, there are growing signs that the 
outbreak is ebbing in some quarters of the world.  This affords us an opportunity to evaluate the 
effectiveness of national mitigation strategies.  Indeed, the effective performance is enveloped in 
and influenced by a nation’s level of socio-economic development.  For example, available 
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healthcare resources such as hospital beds, intensive care units, ventilators, and testing capacity 
affected the containment efforts (Li et al., 2020); elderly people were more vulnerable as seen in 
elevated numbers of serious illness and death (United Nations, 2020); low-income communities 
and people of color were being hit the hardest not only because of their higher levels of 
preexisting health conditions and lower access to healthcare but also because they were less able 
to afford to practice social distancing in the United States (van Dorn et al., 2020; Weill et al., 
2020) while income deprivation and ethnicity were associated with greater COVID-19 mortality 
in England (Rose et al., 2020).  Other factors, such as humidity and temperature, national 
research capacity and expertise, magnitude and timing of interventions, and strategic planning 
for emergencies, matter as well. 
However, there also needs to be a cultural understanding of the relationship between 
restrictive measures and containment efforts as culture may be pivotal to satisfactory outcomes.  
Human behavior is culturally based and embedded and citizens in different countries may 
respond to the same challenge differently.  Ultimately, lifesaving and suffering-relieving could 
only be achieved through behavioral change of the affected citizens.  Bearing this in mind, this 
article presents an effort to explore whether national cultures affected the viral containment by 
way of behavioral changes. 
Inspired by the studies of national cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980; 1983; 2001) and 
of cultural tightness–looseness (Gelfand, 2018; Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011), we 
developed an integrated framework of individualism–collectivism and tightness–looseness to 
investigate how differences in national cultures may have affected the outcomes of the COVID-
19 containment.  We traced the effectiveness of a nation’s lockdown or similar measures 
(hereafter referred to as “lockdown”) during a 30-day period after its 15-day implementation 
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using three popular public health indicators: the change of prevalence rate (ΔPR), the change of 
crude mortality rate (ΔCMR), and the case fatality rate (CFR).  
In what follows, we review relevant literature and develop our theoretical framework.  
Then we use country-level data to empirically test how cultures shaped nations’ responses to the 
pandemic and how countries with variations in cultural tightness–looseness and individualism–
collectivism led to different outcomes in containing COVID-19.  We use a four-quadrant 
conceptual framework to categorize and discuss national differences in the containment 
outcomes and conclude with policy implications in government responses, strategic planning, 
cultural adaptability, and policy implementations for the world’s continuous combat with the 
invisible and deadly virus. 
 
Cultural Constructs and Their Measurements 
Scholars from a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, and psychology, have 
been interested in and studied culture for decades.  Despite its pervasiveness, ambiguity, and the 
great varieties of dimensions, culture is generally perceived to encompass values, beliefs, norms, 
and other components that guide and affect human behaviors in a society.  In aggregate, individuals’ 
behaviors form and reinforce a nation’s culture.  When the world is in crisis, government in each 
country takes action, but prevailing national cultures could help shape citizens’ responses and in 
turn lead to significantly different outcomes. 
Two streams of psychological research have motivated us.  First, Geert Hofstede’s 
construct of national cultural dimensions shows that a nation’s culture on a particular value 
dimension is related to behavior of its nationals.  As an organizational psychologist, he initially 
studied how employees from different nations and disciplines perceived four culture-related 
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dimensions – power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism–collectivism, and 
masculinity–femininity and then evolved them into six dimensions of national cultures (Hofstede 
1980; 1983; 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010).  Among them, the individualism–collectivism 
dimension stands out to be the most relevant to our study for its utility in explaining and 
predicting cross-national differences in behavior (Fischer et al., 2009).  The second is a cultural 
psychological one, starting with an observation by Michele J. Gelfand (2020) that “tightly 
controlled societies, like Singapore’s, have done a better job of containing the new coronavirus 
than ‘loose’ societies, like Italy and the United States.”  A pioneer in the study of cultural 
tightness and looseness, Gelfand has, along her colleagues, developed indexes to measure 
variations of cultural tightness–looseness across 33 nations and 50 America’s states (Gelfand 
2018; Gelfand et al. 2011; Harrington and Gelfand, 2014). 
 
The individualism–collectivism dimension. Among Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions, 
individualism–collectivism is the most frequently used one and has the greatest predictive power 
(Taras et al., 2012).  Specifically, the individualism–collectivism dimension denotes the extent to 
which an individual sees themselves primarily as an autonomous entity (individualism) or 
embedded in a closely connected group (collectivism).  A collectivist culture prioritizes meeting 
an individual’s social role in a group over their personal fulfilment.  On the contrary, an 
individualist culture refers to a situation in which an individual acts on their own interest 
assuming no social belonging and obligation and no intention to protect the interests of other 
members in return for their reciprocal treatment (Miller et al., 1990; Hofstede, 2001). 
Moreover, loose ties between individuals in the individualist culture makes it less likely 
to punish a rule breaker who adheres to the individualist cultural ideal of autonomy, and doing so 
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may enhance the rule breaker’s status culturally (Stamkou et al., 2019).  However, pervasive 
social norms and less tolerance of deviance in the collectivist culture demand strong sanctions 
for anyone defying their duties and obligations as a group member.  These also are applicable to 
nations, which differ because of variations in their cultures being individualist or collectivist.  
When there is a crisis, deviation and irresponsible and irrational behavior are more likely to 
occur in nations where individualism prevails. 
The individualism–collectivism measure was one of the four cultural dimensions in 
Hofstede’s original work (1980).  Hofstede employed a standardized factor analysis based on 
data gathered from some 116,000 questionnaires containing 150 questions administered for two 
periods of 1967 to 1969 and 1971 to 1973 to IBM employees in more than 40 overseas 
subsidiaries.  For reliability and validity considerations, he only used questions showing a 
correlation score higher than 0.5 to calculate the scales and controlled bias from occupational 
positions.  Hofstede’s study was eventually replicated and extended to cover 6 dimensions for 76 
countries and regions (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 34–36).  The quantification of cultural traits 
based on large sample sizes makes Hofstede measures a popular source of empirical studies.  
While there have been debates on and critiques of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions regarding the 
internal validity of the dimensions, subsequent studies have largely confirmed their value and 
validity at the national level.  For example, in 2014–2016, through analyzing new data from large 
probabilistic samples with 52,974 respondents from 56 countries, Minkov et al. (2017) proposed 




Cultural tightness–looseness. Standing on the shoulders of other scholars (Pelto, 1968; Triandis, 
1989), the cultural psychologist Gelfand and her colleagues have developed the cultural 
tightness–looseness construct (Gelfand et al., 2006; 2011; Gelfand 2018).  The cultural tightness 
comes from “the strength of social norms” and “the strength of sanctioning” (Gelfand et al., 
2006, p. 1226).  Those cultures that “have strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior” 
are defined “tight” and those having “weak norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior” 
“loose” (Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 1100). 
Having realized that cultural tightness–looseness is “part of a complex, loosely integrated 
system that involves processes across multiple levels of analysis” (Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 1102), 
along with colleagues, Gelfand has further developed a multilevel model of tightness–looseness.  
The cultural tightness–looseness could be examined at three levels: the micro or 
individual/community level, the meso or regional/city/provincial/state level, and the macro or 
national level.  This is exactly what cultural psychologists have been exploring.  Based on a 
survey in 33 nations, for example, Gelfand et al. (2011) pioneered the quantitative measurement 
of cultural tightness and looseness, or a “Gelfand Tightness Index.”  Scholars have used the 
“Gelfand Tightness Index” to study effective leadership (Aktas et al., 2015); changing American 
culture (Jackson et al., 2019); innovation, urbanization, and happiness in China (Chua et al., 
2019), among others.  Most recently, Gelfand et al. (2020) expanded their coverage of nations to 
57. 
Meanwhile, unsatisfied with the problem of “unrepresentative samples” in the 
development of the “Gelfand Tightness Index” (Uz, 2015, p. 1103), Irem Uz, also a cultural 
psychologist, explored the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 
(EWVS) integrated dataset and used a dispersion-based measure as an alternative approach to 
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measure the cultural tightness and looseness in 68 countries.  Such a “Uz Tightness Index” has 
advantages over the “Gelfand Tightness Index” for cross-nation comparative analysis as it 
resulted from surveys of a larger number of respondents (101,172 versus 22,863) and it covered 
more countries (68 versus 57).  This enhanced index has three sub-indexes – domain specific, 
domain general, and combined – so as to be more comprehensive, which was also later cross-
validated (Uz, 2018).  The “Uz Tightness Index” has drawn considerable scholarly attention and 
has been used in multiple empirical studies (Thomson et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2019). 
Each of the research streams has its merits in explaining how nations’ differences 
manifest in cultures.  Cultural tightness and individualism are not mutually exclusive but 
distinctive (Harrington and Gelfand, 2014).  It occurs to us intuitively that we may borrow, and 
indeed integrate, or humbly reintegrate by following Hofstede (1983), both constructs for our 
purpose.  Together, they serve as a theoretical lens to guide our analytical approach while the 
COVID-19 pandemic, as a natural experiment, provides us with real-time global data for 
theorizing and testing. 
 
Data, Methodology, and Findings 
We employed correlation and hierarchical multiple regression approaches for empirical analysis. 
In data preparation and research design, we paid special attention to measurement equivalence 
and systems thinking (George et al., 2020).  We used multiple indicators to measure the 
outcomes of the COVID-19 containment, as no single measure could fully capture the 
complexity in assessing the effectiveness of national responses to the pandemic.  Besides the 
major cultural indicators, we also controlled several important variables to check how national 
cultures exerted their impacts. 
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Dependent variables: The containment outcomes. The effectiveness of slowing the spread of 
COVID-19 can be traced by monitoring increases in cases and deaths as well as mortality rate 
over a certain period.  However, simply setting up a starting date and a cut-off date for all nations 
would be inappropriate.  As a worldwide public health emergency, the coronavirus pandemic 
struck nations in sequence rather than in parallel and governments’ reactions to the pandemic 
also happened in an asynchronous pattern, thus raising challenges in data preparation for a 
comparative study across nations under government interventions to mitigate or stop the virus. 
To ensure a comparison of national performances in the COVID-19 containment at the 
same phase of government intervention, we chose a benchmark date of 15 days after a nation’s 
lockdown.  This was not a fully arbitrary choice but based on several characteristics of the 
COVID-19 transmission.  First, existing studies indicated that the average time from onset of 
symptoms to death was 15.4 days for COVID-19 patients (Guan et al., 2020).  Second, COVID-
19 has an incubation period up to 14 days and a 14-day self-quarantine policy had been widely 
implemented for individuals with a COVID-19 exposure.  Third, it takes time for government 
interventions intended to change people’s lifestyles to be reasonably effective.  Therefore, a 
buffer of 15 days seems reasonable for citizens to learn and get used to the new abnormal 
situation.  Given that the duration of the COVID-19 evolution varied greatly across nations, a 
short period of one or two weeks may be inadequate to capture the effectiveness of containment 
efforts.  For comparison, we decided to use a “30-day timeframe between the 16th and the 45th 
days into the implementation of a lockdown” (hereafter referred to as “the allotted 30-day 
period”) in each country and traced changes accordingly.  
The increases can be quantified either by absolute change in numbers, measured by the 
difference between observed values at the starting and ending days of the period, or by relative 
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change in percentages, measured by absolute change divided by the initial value at the starting 
day.  Different assumptions of growth patterns underlie these measures.  The increase in numbers 
assumes a linear growth and the percentage change is tied to an exponential pattern.  When little 
or no actions were taken to mitigate a pandemic, the case/death growth pattern would be 
exponential.  Even with government intervention, during the early period of a pandemic, the 
number of infected cases and deaths would still very likely grow exponentially.  However, since 
our study traces the case/death changes in a nation starting from 15 days after a lockdown, the 
effort on “flattening the curve” should have already been effective and, thus, the linear 
assumption better captures the reality than the exponential one.  A visual inspection of growth 
patterns of cases and deaths per million population (p.m.p.) during the allotted 30-day period in 
our sample nations confirmed that the growth pattern in most of the countries under study was 
linear or close to linear (see Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 also illustrates how nations differed in the growth in cases and deaths p.m.p. 
during the period.  We used three popular public health indictors to measure performance in 
slowing the virus contagion in a country: 
 Increase in the prevalence rate (ΔPR): Measured by the increase of reported cases 
p.m.p. during the allotted 30-day period;   
 Increase in the crude mortality rate (ΔCMR): Measured by the increase of reported 
deaths p.m.p. during the allotted 30-day period; and 
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 Case fatality rate (CFR): Measured by the increase of reported deaths from COVID-
19 divided by the increase of infected cases during the allotted 30-day period. 
These three simple, straightforward, and practical indictors jointly reflect a comprehensive 
picture of a country’s containment efforts.  The lower their values, the higher the effectiveness of 
a nation’s containment efforts. 
Our data on COVID-19 infected cases and deaths were derived from “Our World in 
Data” (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data, accessed 27 May 2020.  Lockdown dates for 
all but six countries in our sample were retrieved from “Global COVID-19 Lockdown Tracker” 
(https://auravision.ai/covid19-lockdown-tracker/, accessed 05/10/2020) and those of the 
remainder from a BBC News article (Dunford et al., 2020). 
For the sake of robustness of data analysis, we scrutinized normality of the three 
dependent variables.  Histograms of distributions of these variables showed that they were all 
highly positively skewed.  Even with log-transformation, one dependent variable still failed the 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (p<0.05).  We then used the Van der Waerden’s formula to obtain 
normalized scores for all three dependent variables. 
 
Independent cultural variables. As indicated, there are two indexes – the “Gelfand Tightness 
Index” and “Uz Tightness Index” – to measure cross-national cultural tightness–looseness.  
While both have proven to be valid in empirical testing, we adopted the “Uz Tightness Index” 
mainly because it covers more countries. 
We calculated a combined tightness–looseness index based on the three components of 
the “Uz Tightness Index,” namely the cultural tightness and looseness domain specific 
(CTL_DS), the cultural tightness and looseness domain general (CTL_DG), and the cultural 
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tightness and looseness combination (CTL_C).  While all nations in our sample had CTL_DS 
scores, several were with missing scores for CTL_DG (Saudi Arabia and Singapore), or CTL_C 
(Pakistan), or both (China and Venezuela).  Faced with a tradeoff between ensuring data 
accuracy by excluding nations with missing scores and maintaining a sample size by estimating 
the missing values, we chose sample size over accuracy because keeping the sample size as 
adequate as possible would be critical to the reliability of regression analysis.  Estimations of the 
missing values were based on simple linear regressions of CTL_DG and CTL_C on CTL_DS 
using data for our sample nations (CTL_DG=14.825+0.896*CTL_DS, R2=0.581, n=53; 
CTL_C=14.937+0.760*CTL_DS, R2=0.523, n=54).   
The combined cultural tightness–looseness index (hereafter “the tightness index”) was 
calculated using the Principle Component Analysis (PCA) factor loading weighted average of the 
above three variables.  The PCA with Varimax rotation indicated that the tightness index 
explained 85.6% of the total variance.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
was 0.736 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2(10)=118.8, p<.001).  Factor loadings 
for CTL_DS, CTL_DG, and CTL_C were 0.897, 0.946, and 0.931, respectively.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.915, showing excellent internal consistency among the three variables.  
Thus, the combined tightness index is deemed a good composite measure.  In addition, this 
approach allowed for retaining the scale metric and made it easy for interpretation.  All values of 
the tightness index in our sample were between 0 and 100, with a culturally tightest nation 
having a score of 0.  
The individualism–collectivism measure (hereafter “the individualism score”) was taken 
from Hofstede’s six-dimension national culture index.  We retrieved the individualism score 
from the Hofstede Insights website at https://www.hofstede-insights.com/ (accessed 10 May 
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2020).  The individualism measure is on a scale of 1 to 100 with a higher score indicating a more 
individualist national culture. 
Significant relationship between individualism and tightness (our sample data indicated 
r=0.531, p<0.01) implies an interaction effect between the two and their interaction may also 
contribute to the Covid-19 containment under government intervention.  An interaction variable 
was thus created as the third cultural variable. 
 
Control variables. Many social, political, economic, demographical, and environmental factors 
may be considered as potential confounding variables that significantly contribute to the spread 
of COVID-19.  Measures of public health such as death rate, mortality, and life expectancy 
(Marmot, 2005), of socio-economic status, such as GDP, GDP per capital, and income disparity 
(Kawachi and Kennedy, 1999), and of demographics such as population density, population age 
structure (Ferguson et al., 2006; Kucharski et al., 2014) could potentially determine the 
effectiveness in combating a public health emergency.  Given our relatively small sample size, 
we limited our control variables to the following three: 
 Stringency of government responses to COVID-19.  We adopted the Oxford’s daily 
government stringency index, a synthesis of information on daily government 
responses to COVID-19 in nine categories, including school closure, workplace 
closures, travel bans, cancellation of public events, and social distancing.  The index 
is measured on a scale of 1 to 100.  We calculated the overall government stringency 
index value as the average of index values during the allotted 30-day period for each 
country.  This index is about what governments in different countries wanted their 
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citizens to follow and therefore it is not an evaluation of the appropriateness or 
effectiveness of a country’s responses.   
 Median Age.  We used median age to measure life expectancy in a nation.  Countries 
with higher median ages have a higher proportion of elderly people.  It has been 
widely reported that elderly people are most vulnerable to COVID-19.  
 Population Density.  We used number of people per square kilometer. 
The Oxford’s daily government stringency index was downloaded on the website 
https://covidtracker.bsg.ox.ac.uk/ (accessed 26 May 2020) and data of median age and 
population density were retrieved form “Our World in Data” 
(https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data, accessed 27 May 2020). 
With constraints in data sources, our sample includes 55 nations that have data available 
for all variables.  Table 1 lists sample nations with their tightness index, individualism, three 
control variables, as well as calculated values of ΔPR, ΔCMR, and CFR for each country during 
the allotted 30-day period. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Overall, we expected the tightness index, individualism score, and the interaction 
between the two to be all positively related to the containment of COVID-19 measured by ΔPR, 
ΔCMR, and CFR.  A higher tightness score refers to a looser society.  This looseness 
characteristic thus may lead to significant variations in people’s behavior in following 
government orders to mitigate the coronavirus.  Similarly, people of a society that values 
collective efforts tend to strictly comply with government restriction instructions and 
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recommendations, while individualist persons likely pay more attention to themselves and their 
immediate family members.  The interaction between cultural tightness and individualism 
reinforces each other and may therefore hinder the viral containment efforts. 
 
Findings. Prior to the multiple regression analysis, we checked descriptive statistics and the 
Pearson correlations between paired variables (see Table 2).  The tightness index and 
individualism score were both significantly related to all three dependent variables.  The linear 
relationship between our cultural variables and the effectiveness of containing the spread of 
COVID-19 is visualized in Figure 2 as results of our baseline models.  We observed that looser 
or more individualist nations had higher values of increase in prevalence rate (PR), crude 
mortality rate (CMR), and case fatality rate (CFR), which is consistent with our expectation.  A 
comparison of R2 values of all six baseline models indicated that explanatory power of cultural 
variables was the highest for change in CMR and the lowest for CFR, and individualism had 
better explanatory power than tightness in accounting for variations in all three dependent 
variables. 
 
[Table 2 and Figure 2 here] 
 
We then proceeded with hierarchical regressions to check the effects of the three cultural 
variables controlling for the stringency of government intervention, population density, and 
median age.  Vietnam was excluded from the modeling because it acted as an outlier in 
regression analysis due to its extremely low value of infected cases and zero death count during 
the period of interest.  Regression results are summarized in Tables 3 to 5. 
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[Tables 3 to 5 here] 
 
As Tables 3 to 5 indicate, among the three control variables, median age and population 
density exerted their significant impacts on ΔPR, ΔCMR, and CFR.  The contribution of median 
age was consistently positive, indicating that the elderly not only were more vulnerable to the 
infection but also had higher mortality rate than the young and middle-aged people.  
Interestingly, empirical results show that a higher population density would lead to higher ΔPR 
but lower ΔCMR and CFR.  Further investigation is needed to fully reveal the causal relationship 
of this phenomenon.  One possible explanation is that, while higher population density is 
associated with more human-to-human interactions which increase the chance of infection, it 
also could mean more convenient access to healthcare infrastructure for people in need of 
medical treatments.  Despite the fact that there are high population density areas with insufficient 
healthcare resources, previous research found no significant relationship between population 
density and standard of living at the national level (Boulhol and de Serres, 2010).  Accordingly, 
we postulate that a nation’s population density has no significant relationship with its density of 
medical resources measured by the number of nurses, doctors, and hospital beds per unit of 
population.  Other factors held constant, on average, people in nations of higher population 
density would take shorter trips for a doctor’s visit to receive timely diagnosis and treatment. 
Surprisingly, we found that the stringency of government response to COVID-19 did not 
show significant relationship with ΔPR, ΔCMR, or CFR.  This means that variations in how 
government tackled COVID-19 in enforcing restrictions was not deterministic to cross-nation 
variations in the virus’s spread.  Indeed, the stringency index measures neither the 
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appropriateness nor effectiveness of those policies.  Rather, it merely indicates what actions that 
governments in different nations had taken.  Whether those measures can effectively contain the 
pandemic is up to how they had been implemented.  Descriptive statistics shows that the index 
has a high mean value of 79 and a relatively low standard deviation of 13 (see Table 2), 
suggesting that in general governments’ policies across nations were very strict and without 
much variation. 
Thus, the effectiveness of the policies is largely up for other factors, such as cultures, to 
explain.  Our arguments that cultural factors have significant impacts on the spread of 
coronavirus have been verified by the empirics.  For ΔPR and ΔCMR, both cultural tightness and 
individualism measures significantly contributed to outcomes of the coronavirus containment.  
Loose and individualist nations experienced a higher rate of increase in infected cases than those 
with tight and collective cultures.   
The interaction between tightness and individualism is a significant predictor for ΔCMR 
but not for ΔPR.  In fact, our hierarchical regression results show that the total explanatory 
power of cultural variables is higher for ΔCMR than for ΔPR.  The differences between adjusted 
R2 values for model 1 and model 2 indicates that including cultural variables raised the adjusted 
R2 value by 0.180 for the regression on ΔPR and by 0.225 for ΔCMR.  
Although our baseline models proved that both cultural factors were significantly related 
to CFR, during the allotted 30-day period, when controlling for factors of government 
stringency, median age, and population density, neither tightness nor individualism alone showed 
significantly impact on the reduction of CFR.  However, their interaction had a significant and 
positive relationship with CFR, or the two distinct cultural factors did interact to have a joint 
impact on the possible recovery or death for people infected by COVID-19. 
 17 
Overall, cultural factors accounted for a large proportion of the explanatory power for the 
spread or containment of COVID-19 when controlling for the stringency of government 
response, median age (a proxy for life expectancy), and population density: 18% out of 50.3% 
for ΔPR, 22.5% out of 58.4% for ΔCMR, and 12% out of 31.6% for CFR, or our cultural 
variables explained a significant portion of the variation in ΔPR, ΔCMR, and CFR across 
countries.  Therefore, actions taken to combat the spread of Covid-19 in different countries were 
deeply embedded in personal behavior patterns that are heavily influenced by social values, 
norms, morals, customs, and beliefs in these countries.  In short, cultures were deterministic to 
the containment of COVID-19. 
 
Collectivism–Individualism and Tightness–Looseness: Toward an Integrated Framework 
The psychology literature treats collectivism–individualism and tightness–looseness as related 
but clearly differentiated constructs, both theoretically and empirically (Tridandis, 1989; 
Carpenter, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2006), although collectivism and tightness covary moderately 
(Gelfand et al. 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011).  For example, tightness is about strict societal rules 
whose breakers would be punished whereas individualism–collectivism emphasizes an 
individual’s fulfilling duties and obligations in a group while also being independently oriented 
(Stamkou et al., 2019). 
Our empirics show that neither the individualism score nor the tightness index is 
sufficient to account for the differences across nations in their COVID-19 containment 
outcomes.  Indeed, these cultural constructs are complementary rather than redundant.  Both are 
continuous measures rather than dichotomies, meaning that each nation occupies a position on a 
continuum in each construct.  This also gave us justification to formulate an integrated 
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framework by treating individualism and tightness as theoretically independent cultural 
constructs while also integrating them in the cross-country culture study (Stamkou et al., 2019).  
By placing nations in a cultural quadrant of tightness–looseness and individualism–collectivism, 
we were able to develop the two one-dimensional constructs into a two-by-two quadrant locating 
nations with four distinct types of integrated cultures (Gelfand et al., 2006), thus expanding their 
respective explanatory power and advantages. 
By categorizing nations under study into four quadrants – loose–individualist, tight–
individualist, loose–collectivist, and tight–collectivist, with 50 as cutting-off points, Figure 3 
illustrates how each nation’s unique culture characteristics shaped the spread of coronavirus with 
the bubble size representing the ΔCMR over the allotted 30-day period.  Apparently, on average, 
bubbles (nations) in the loose–individualist quadrant had much larger sizes than those in the 
tight–collectivist quadrant, suggesting that governments in loose–individualist nations were less 
likely to have their restrictive orders fully enforced. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
This two-by-two cultural quadrant framework turns out to be powerful in explaining 
differences in containment performance across nations.  The 20 loose–individualist countries 
were mostly from economically developed Western Europe and North America, which generally 
had not performed well in their fight against COVID-19.  The United States witnessed the largest 
numbers of infected cases and deaths, despite its capacity in medical research that may have 
helped the country to rein in the pandemic.  In addition to disrespect for science and 
professionals and preparedness at critical organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control 
 19 
and Prevention, the failure of America’s war on COVID-19 also resulted from mixed signals and 
initial inaction in terms of federal responses, as well as delayed and less strict stay-at-home 
orders by state governments and undisciplined and often indifferent behavior of its citizens with 
creed of individualism.  A recent study showed that during mid-March roughly 40% Americans 
did not comply with social-distancing recommendations (Moore et al., 2020).  By comparison, 
Germany, whose culture is similarly loose but less individualist, was able to keep both its 
prevalence rate and crude mortality rate far lower than the United States despite both countries’ 
very close scores of the stringency index of government response (see Table 1).  One possible 
explanation is that, unlike the Americans, Germans see somebody moving too close to 
themselves as an intrusion into their personal space and become uncomfortable (Ferraro, 2001, p. 
89), thus leading to an increased propensity for people in this nation to strictly comply with the 
social-distancing policy. 
The loose–collectivist culture quadrant contains eleven countries, mostly from Eastern 
Europe and Latin America plus India.  For example, we see that Russia experienced an outbreak 
of infected cases although its crude mortality rate remained low.  Modest in both looseness and 
collectiveness, this nation’s spirit of collectiveness is tied to disrespectfulness of privacy in 
public places, which Russians consider as impersonal (Alekseyeva, 2017), raising challenges for 
social distancing.  A survey in April revealed that only 36% Russians observed the one-meter 
social-distancing policy (Russian News Agency, 2020).  There was an initial lack of clear 
direction from or ignorance in the Kremlin and Russia was full of misinformation or inaccurate 
information on COVID-19.  However, stronger responses and collective efforts at the regional 
and municipal levels probably made the country escape a much worse humanitarian crisis. 
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Among the 20 nations in the tight–collectivist culture quadrant are China, Japan, Korea, 
and Singapore where common cultural characteristics, such as deference to authority, collectivity 
orientation, conflict aversion, and emphasis on harmony, make it natural for their citizens to 
follow government recommendations.  For example, heavily influenced by Confucianism that 
promotes self-discipline and dutiful conduct toward one’s superiors and family members, when 
faced with emergencies, the Chinese are often willing to not only comply with government 
policy but also voluntarily take more strict measures.  The COVID-19 outbreak happened to be 
followed by the Chinese New Year, during which the mobility of people accelerated the viral 
spread from Wuhan, the epicenter, to other Chinese cities and to other countries or regions until 
Beijing ordered rigid, bureaucratic, and infantilizing lockdowns on Wuhan and other parts of the 
country.  For a period of 76 days, the number of times and the errands for which Wuhanese could 
leave homes were limited and in doing so they had to carry a signed and dated card listing the 
hours and reasons.  Such moves proved effective: China on March 19 announced no new 
domestic cases of COVID-19 for the first time since the start of the outbreak and on April 8 
lifted the lockdown in Wuhan. 
Only three countries fall in the tight–individualist culture quadrant.  Information in 
Figure 3 and Table 1 shows that Hungary is highly individualist but modestly tight.  In fact, 
Hungary is culturally tighter than almost all other European nations.  Early on, the Hungarian 
government declared a national emergency and then passed a specific Act to Contain COVID-19, 
granting government the authority to extend the national emergency state endlessly until a new 
order to end it.  Meanwhile, Hungarians behaved self-disciplinarily.  In the end, the successful 
conclusion of the first efforts against COVID-19 could be attributed to both government’s taking 
all the necessary actions in due time and the sacrifice and discipline of the Hungarian citizens. 
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Conclusions and Discussions 
In this article, we explored whether countries with cultural variations in tightness–looseness and 
individualism–collectivism led to different outcomes in curbing the spread of COVID-19.  
Specifically, with empirical data from 54 nations, we utilized the hierarchical regression 
approach to check the effects of three cultural variables – the individualism score, the tightness 
index, and their interaction – on the increase in the prevalence rate, increase in the crude 
mortality rate, and case fatality rate, counting from the 16th to 45th days after governments’ 
restrictive measures, while controlling for the stringency of government responses to COVID-19, 
median age, and population density. 
Not only did cultural tightness and individualism have significant impacts on the 
containment of the coronavirus, both cultural factors also interacted to have a joint impact on 
flattening the curve.  Loose and individualist nations experienced higher rate of increases in 
infected cases and deaths than tight and collective ones.  Overall, cultural factors accounted for a 
large proportion of the explanatory power for variations in COVID-19 containments across 
nations. 
Our analysis also showed that the stringency of government responses to COVID-19 did 
not significantly explain cross-nation variations in virus containment outcomes.  This does not 
imply that governments’ interventions had no effect on the mitigation of the coronavirus.  On the 
contrary, without timely government interventions, the entire situation would have been much 
worse, i.e., we would have seen continuous exponential growth of infected cases and deaths.  
The reality reaffirms that successful implementations of public policies for mitigating or 
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stopping viral transmission required both governments’ determination and the public’s exercise 
of conformity and self-control.  The latter is really where national cultures matter. 
 
Policy implications. Our findings have significant policy implications as the COVID-19 threat is 
still looming globally.  First, given the slowly changing nature of national cultures, in order to 
achieve a similar level of effectiveness in containing the spread of COVID-19 in nations of tight 
and collectivist cultures, governments of Western nations with loose and individualist cultures 
need to take more stringent measures to mitigate transmission of the virus.  Failure to do so 
would lead to higher infected cases and more deaths.  This has been the case in Italy, Spain, 
France, and the United States.  The story of Argentina tells how the government could adopt far 
stricter policies in a loose society to battle the coronavirus.  Confronted with a public health 
emergency, Argentina was able to enforce tight coordination between the central government, 
governors and mayors over lockdown measures.  Table 1 indicates Argentina was one of the 
most stringent nations in terms of government response.  Now, Argentina feels confident enough 
to start relaxing social-distancing rules in most of the nation except the densely populated 
Buenos Aires metropolitan area.  In contrast, government responses in Iran were less severe than 
needed.  When the pandemic first hit, the Iranian government rejected plans to quarantine entire 
cities and areas.  Although a ban was announced on travel between cities only when there was an 
increase in the number of new cases, Iran probably loosed its restrictive measures prematurely 
and the country is in the risk of a COVID-19 comeback. 
Second, cultural factors tend to self-reinforce overtime, leading to path dependence that 
locks in human behavior patterns.  Although highly challenging, Western nations rooted in 
cultural looseness and individualism need to be more flexible and cooperative to overcome the 
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path dependence when emergencies like COVID-19 hit.  That is, while safeguarding individual 
rights remains essential (French and Raymond, 2009), citizens may have to tighten up, at least 
temporarily, and become more self-disciplined and endure government’s restrictive rules 
(Gelfand, 2018, p. 69).  In order to do so, these governments need to incorporate cultural 
awareness into the formulation of national strategies for emergencies and prepare and implement 
interventions in a culturally adaptive way. 
Third, tightening up would become most effective only when it is enforced at all levels, 
from national, regional/state levels, to local communities.  This is true even for the tight and 
collectivist nations.  In China, for example, community-based organizations played distinct roles 
in containing the coronavirus (Cheng et al., 2020).  During the lockdown, gatekeepers were 
placed at every building, living community, and village to control the ins and outs of residents by 
checking their certificated cards and monitoring their temperatures.  In contrary, in countries 
such as Italy and Spain, although governments issued strict intervention measures at the national 
and regional levels, with individualist indulgence, citizens did not necessarily follow the orders 
of social distancing or sheltering in place, thus leading to failure and delayed ease of the 
containment and the loss of so many people that was nothing less than a tragedy. 
Nonetheless, as every culture has its own merits, there is neither necessity nor possibility 
for an overhaul of any national culture.  There needs recognition that the loose and individualist 
cultures prove to be associated with societies that enjoy higher living standards and technological 
creativity (see, for example, Harrington et al., 2015; Chua et al., 2019; Jackson et al., 2019), 
although we do not mean to suggest alienating those from collectivist cultures who also enjoy 
their living standards and engage in technological creativity. 
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In short, confronted by crises such as COVID-19, a government has to make swift 
decisions and undertake severe and sometimes inflexible measures recognizing the necessity to 
maximize the interests of its citizens.  However, such decisions have to be built on the 
government’s understanding of the national culture and especially how such culture possibly 
effects human behavior.  Indeed, it is every individual’s action to comply with government’s 
mitigation orders that is the key to the nation’s performance in crises.  It is also every 
individual’s behavior and a comprehensive understanding of the cultural effects on behavior that 
could enhance the overall effectiveness of a culturally aware government involved in the 
management of emergency responses. 
 
Limitations and Future Research. Despite our efforts in research design and data preparation, 
this study is not without limitations.  First, there are concerns of data reliability.  Numbers of 
infected cases are often related to how many tests have been conducted and nations vary greatly 
by their testing capacities and by the criteria as to who should be tested.  In addition, such criteria 
may change as nations’ test capacities expand.  Nations also differ in the practice of reporting 
COVID-19 related deaths.  Some nations only report COVID-19 deaths of people who were 
tested coronavirus positive.  Others also report suspected deaths caused by pneumonia with 
symptoms of COVID-19 without test results.  Besides, reporting criteria could be inconsistent 
even within a nation.  For example, there were sudden increases of reported deaths in Wuhan, 
China and in New York, the United States.  Second, our sample is constrained by the number of 
nations involved in the study of cultural tightness–looseness and individualism–collectivism.  
This small sample size may be also inadequate to be fully representative as no country is from 
Oceania and Brazil and many African countries are excluded.  Future research would be greatly 
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enriched if the tightness-looseness index and the Hofstede’s dimension measures could be 
updated and expanded to cover more nations. 
Finally, even though we understand that many nations display enormous cultural 
diversities in both constructs, we were unable to account for such intra-nation differences.  In 
particular, cultural variation does exist between races, communities, and regions within a nation 
(Harrington and Gelfand, 2014; Chua et al., 2019), and this variation did have significant impact 
on the containment of COVID-19.  However, since we have nation as the unit of analysis, 
disparities within nations in these domains go beyond the scope of this paper.  We also do not 
have sufficient information to dive into the state or regional level for their responses to the 
pandemic, especially how much each of the factors analyzed in the article contributed to the 
existence of stark differences, say, between New York and California and other states early on 
and to the resurgence of the virus in California but not New York later.  We see this is a 
promising area for future research. 
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ΔPR  ΔCMR 
CFR 
(%) 
Albania ALB 3/13/20 35.0 20 84.1 104.9 38 187.6 6.6 3.5 
Argentina ARG 3/19/20 73.4 46 97.0 16.2 31.9 101.1 5.2 5.1 
Austria AUT 3/16/20 71.6 55 75.1 106.7 44.4 638.0 52.4 8.2 
Bangladesh BGD 3/26/20 3.2 20 92.3 1265.0 27.5 81.6 1.2 1.4 
Belgium BEL 3/18/20 98.1 75 81.5 375.6 41.8 3025.8 593.2 19.6 
Bulgaria BGR 3/13/20 60.5 30 72.3 65.2 44.7 144.9 7.6 5.3 
Canada CAN 3/13/20 77.0 80 72.9 4.0 41.4 1118.4 66.4 5.9 
Chile CHL 3/19/20 82.0 23 73.2 24.3 35.4 786.3 12.0 1.5 
China CHN 1/23/20 38.2 20 77.9 147.7 38.7 34.5 1.7 5.0 
Croatia HRV 3/18/20 53.6 33 95.2 73.7 44 273.3 16.8 6.1 
Czech Rep. CZE 3/16/20 58.8 58 69.0 137.2 43.3 427.4 19.0 4.4 
Denmark DNK 3/13/20 60.2 74 75.6 136.5 42.3 1127.2 63.9 5.7 
Egypt EGY 3/19/20 2.6 25 84.3 98.0 25.3 52.9 3.5 6.7 
Estonia EST 3/12/20 51.3 60 80.2 31.0 42.7 827.0 33.9 4.1 
Finland FIN 3/27/20 66.2 63 66.1 18.1 42.8 576.3 39.5 6.9 
France FRA 3/17/20 82.8 71 90.7 122.6 42 1186.6 319.5 26.9 
Germany DEU 3/17/20 71.8 67 73.2 237.0 46.6 1095.1 66.3 6.1 
Greece GRC 3/23/20 61.8 35 83.4 83.5 45.3 87.1 6.5 7.5 
Hungary HUN 3/28/20 43.7 80 69.3 108.0 43.4 197.0 33.7 17.1 
Iceland ISL 3/15/20 42.4 60 53.7 3.4 37.3 2271.1 23.4 1.0 
India IND 3/25/20 81.9 48 95.3 450.4 28.2 39.1 1.3 3.4 
Indonesia IDN 3/26/20 3.0 14 70.7 145.7 29.3 37.8 2.5 6.6 
Iran IRN 3/24/20 23.6 41 56.3 49.8 32.4 953.5 55.6 5.8 
Ireland IRL 3/27/20 62.1 70 88.0 69.9 38.7 3019.0 237.2 7.9 
Italy ITA 3/9/20 66.4 76 92.1 205.9 47.9 2041.0 314.4 15.4 
Japan JPN 4/7/20 42.8 46 45.5 347.8 48.2 39.7 4.8 12.2 
Jordan JOR 3/18/20 3.9 30 96.9 109.3 23.2 17.7 0.3 1.7 
Lithuania LTU 3/16/20 46.1 60 74.8 45.1 43.5 60.6 0.7 1.2 
Luxembourg LUX 3/18/20 94.7 60 75.9 231.4 39.7 2369.1 100.6 4.2 
Mexico MEX 3/21/20 80.7 30 82.4 66.4 29.3 178.5 17.0 9.5 
Morocco MAR 3/19/20 6.1 46 90.7 80.1 29.6 108.9 3.5 3.2 
Netherlands NLD 3/16/20 62.6 80 79.6 508.5 43.2 1578.8 224.5 14.2 
Nigeria NGA 3/30/20 19.4 30 83.1 209.6 18.1 22.5 0.7 3.3 
Pakistan PAK 3/24/20 7.0 14 92.2 255.6 23.5 98.5 2.4 2.5 
Peru PER 3/16/20 47.8 16 94.4 25.1 29.1 1000.3 27.9 2.8 
Philippines PHL 3/15/20 39.3 32 97.2 351.9 25.2 59.7 4.2 7.0 
Poland POL 3/13/20 50.9 60 80.2 124.0 41.8 270.2 13.7 5.1 
Portugal PRT 3/19/20 67.3 27 83.7 112.4 46.2 1584.4 79.8 5.0 
Romania ROU 3/25/20 46.0 30 87.0 85.1 43 522.4 35.8 6.9 
Russia RUS 3/30/20 53.6 39 84.7 8.8 39.6 1534.5 14.1 0.9 
Saudi Arabia SAU 3/9/20 20.4 25 90.8 15.3 31.9 350.7 3.3 0.9 
Singapore SGP 4/7/20 42.2 20 84.0 7915.7 42.4 3536.0 2.1 0.1 
Slovakia SVK 3/16/20 65.8 52 76.9 113.1 41.2 193.2 4.0 2.1 
Slovenia SVN 3/14/20 74.6 27 88.5 102.6 44.5 344.4 35.6 10.3 
South Africa ZAF 3/26/20 71.5 65 86.9 46.8 27.3 126.2 2.8 2.2 
South Korea KOR 2/23/20 29.7 18 67.4 528.0 43.4 58.6 2.9 5.0 
Spain ESP 3/14/20 80.6 51 84.7 93.1 45.5 3012.5 387.8 12.9 
Sweden SWE 3/11/20 61.2 71 36.4 24.7 41 1490.9 208.9 14.0 
Tanzania TZA 3/28/20 23.3 25 50.0 64.7 17.7 8.0 0.3 3.8 
Turkey TUR 4/11/20 21.5 37 78.7 104.9 31.6 593.3 19.7 3.3 
Ukraine UKR 3/17/20 59.0 25 88.9 77.4 41.4 225.4 5.4 2.4 
United Kingdom GBR 3/24/20 74.5 89 75.9 272.9 40.8 2231.3 340.9 15.3 
United States USA 3/17/20 60.8 91 73.5 35.6 38.3 2659.2 178.0 6.7 
Venezuela VEN 3/17/20 46.0 12 82.4 36.3 29 7.0 0.2 3.5 
Vietnam VNM 3/31/20 30.7 20 74.5 308.1 32.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Notes: Lckdn_Date=date of lockdown; Tight=the tightness index; Ind=individualism; Govt_Strgcy=stringency of 
government resopnse to Covid-19; ΔPR=change in prevalence rate in number of caess per million populaiton; 
ΔCMR=change in crude motality rate in number of deaths per million population; CFR=case fatality rate.  
Table 2. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Pearson Correlations 
 
 Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Government Stringency 79.3 13.1 1        
2 Population Density 297.6 1074.8 .074 1       
3 Median Age 37.3 8.0 -.214 .070 1      
4 Tightness 51.3 25.0 -.007 -.082 .557*** 1     
5 Individualism 45.4 22.4 -.241* -.168 .441*** .531*** 1    
6 Normal Score of ΔPR 0.5 0.8 -.044 .280** .547*** .528*** .544*** 1   
7 Normal Score of ΔCMR 0.0 0.9 -.119 -.160 .595*** .621*** .661*** .821*** 1  
8 Normal Score of CFR 0.0 0.9 -.143 -.294** .371*** .403*** .484*** .199 .651*** 1 
 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  ΔPR stands for increase in the prevalence rate; ΔCMR stands for increase 
in the crude mortality rate; CFR stands for case fatality rate.  
Table 3. Regression on the increase in the prevalence rate (ΔPR) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β t p B SE B β t p 
Control Variables           
Government Stringency .051 .109 .054 .468 .642 .070 .098 .075 .720 .475 
Population Density .223 .107 .238 2.092 .042 .311 .094 .332 3.297 .002 
    Median Age 
 
.509 .109 .542 4.666 .000 .255 .120 .271 2.123 .039 
Cultural Variables           
Tightness      .009 .005 .230 1.696 .096 
Individualism      .016 .006 .369 2.821 .007 
Tightness*Individualism      .086 .125 .076 .692 .493 
           
df1, df2     3, 50     3, 47 
F     9.413     9.937 
R2     .361     .559 
Adj. R2     .323     .503 
Durbin-Watson          1.957 
 
Notes: Bold types indicate p<.1; control variables have been standardized.   
 
  
Table 4. Regression on the increase in the crude mortality rate (ΔCMR) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β T p B SE B β t p 
Control Variables           
Government Stringency .026 .106 .028 .249 .805 .030 .089 .032 .334 .740 
Population Density -.192 .104 -.205 -1.855 .069 -.115 .086 -.122 -1.327 .191 
    Median Age 
 
.578 .106 .615 5.445 .000 .344 .110 .366 3.132 .003 
Cultural Variables           
Tightness      .011 .005 .299 2.411 .020 
Individualism      .013 .005 .311 2.594 .013 
Tightness*Individualism      .230 .114 .203 2.011 .050 
           
df1, df2     3, 50     3, 47 
F     10.907     13.392 
R2     .396     .631 
Adj. R2     .359     .584 
Durbin-Watson          1.709 
 
Note: Bold types indicate p<.1; control variables have been standardized.   
 
  
Table 5. Regression on case fatality rate (CFR) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β t p B SE B β t p 
Control Variables           
Government Stringency -.034 .119 -.037 -.289 .773 -.039 .115 -.041 -.338 .737 
Population Density -.298 .116 -.319 -
2.570 
.013 -.260 .111 -.278 -
2.348 
.023 
    Median Age 
 
.362 .119 .385 3.041 .004 .248 .141 .264 1.759 .085 
Cultural Variables           
Tightness      .008 .006 .219 1.378 .175 
Individualism      .007 .006 .172 1.122 .268 
Tightness*Individualism      .311 .147 .274 2.122 .039 
           
df1, df2     3, 50     3, 47 
F     5.312     5.075 
R2     .242     .393 
Adj. R2     .196     .316 
Durbin-Watson          2.091 
 









Figure 1. Growth pattern of Covid-19 cases and deaths per million population between the 16th 





Figure 2.  Cultural variables and the Effectiveness of Covid-19 Containment  
 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of nations by increase in crude mortality rate, tightness–looseness, and 
collectivism–individualism 
 
Note: Bubble size measures increase of death per million population of Covid-19. 
 
 
